There are at least a dozen major league teams that gobble up sophisticated analysts from all corners and use them in any way they can conceive of to improve their valuation of personnel. For years, I wished that the Cubs would be one of those teams, and now that they are, I couldn't be happier about it. But it's not 2003 anymore. What kind of gains can be expected from an analytical front office when there are at least a handful of others who are equally adept at analyzing the numbers?
That's why I'm flummoxed as to why not a single team has placed an analyst in charge of on-field strategy. At least once every other game, I see a manager make a decision that seems obviously wrong, and I don't usually pay attention. Starters are left in too long, platoon advantage opportunities are ignored, closers are left sitting on their asses during high-leverage moments, lineups are ridiculously composed, bunts are altogether too frequent (as is normal), or not frequent enough (in the case of severe defensive shifts), and these are just the obvious errors. Browse through MGL's archives over at The Book Blog for a while to find an obssesive's take on in-game mistakes.
It's easy to understand why these errors are made. The right decision is only marginally better than the wrong one, and the typical major league manager has with his own eyes observed the wrong choice paying off time and again. He is emotionally involved with every pitch and is biased by his interactions with his players in getting them ready to play. Understanding of sound strategy requires large datasets and often simulations. Why should we expect someone who has spent his life focusing on the mechanics of the game to also have a grasp of the numbers? The pool from which managers are selected consists strictly of former players, many of whom didn't graduate from college and have never taken even an "Introduction to Statistics" course.
Terry Francona has been making the media rounds lately in support of his newly published book. The media is predictably taking the opportunity to point and stare at the perceived dysfunction in the Red Sox organization, but I'm more interested to Francona's description of his interaction with Theo Epstein.
In an interview with Bill Simmons, Francona indicated that he was closer to Theo than anyone else in the front office. Peter Abraham points out that Francona frequently clashed with the ownership group, and Theo had to bridge the gap. When Simmons asked specifically about his biggest disagreement with Theo (at approximately the 21 minute mark), Francona had this to say:
Me and Theo, probably our biggest [disagreement] was whether Pap should be a closer or a starter. I always viewed Pap as a closer, and I think Theo always wanted him to somehow start his big league career out in the bullpen, and then transition into the rotation. And it was just a philosophical difference; we never came to blows, but I think that was one we probably differed on. We actually differed on a lot of things, which is healthy. And we had the ability to either talk it out or yell it out, and then the next day, we would be back to normal, which I think is really healthy.
The Abraham post also gives this interesting tidbit:
Epstein hired two "outside consultants" to put together proposed lineups for Francona every day… Francona never met them and he wasn't mandated to use their lineups. But at one point Francona told Epstein he had enough of the suggestions and to keep them to himself.
Francona clearly had the final say in decisions on the field, and I doubt that the situation is different than that of Dale Sveum in Chicago.
It seems to me that sabermetric front offices seek out managers who are of above average intelligence and seem open to considering new ideas. This approach may be conducive to a better working relationship within the organization, but I have yet to see any substantive differences in strategy, save for a defensive shift here or there.
The Cubs are owned by an MBA who gave over complete control of baseball operations to an analytically-minded GM. That GM came in with an excess of goodwill given by a long-suffering fanbase. If you can't give an analyst control of strategy in that set of circumstances, when can you?
Which is more difficult, finding an analyst who is good at interacting with people or finding a former baseball player who is comfortable writing code and dealing with large datasets? There is no need to eliminate coaches in this hypothetical, there is only a need to delegate responsibility.
Eventually there will be analysts in the dugout, of this I have no doubt. And once again I'll be left wondering why the Cubs couldn't be first movers and how long it will take them to catch up to the innovators in the league.
Comments
Joe Maddon?
Mercurial OutfielderQuote Reply
@ Mercurial Outfielder:
I don’t follow the Rays that closely, but I don’t buy it. He claims to not have a closer, but seems to me that he ends up using his the same way everyone else does.
MGL used to take aim at him on a pretty regular basis, and I usually agreed with his posts.
I think Maddon is great with his players, but wouldn’t go much further than that.
GWQuote Reply
This is a really good article. Bench coach would seem to be the perfect role for an analyst at this point. No chance they’re given the managerial job without first seeing how it might work.
dmick89Quote Reply
Rice CubeQuote Reply
This is really good, GW. I think part of the reason there might be reluctance to go with an analyst as a manager is that the players might not respect decisions they don’t understand.
They’ve been coached their whole lives by guys who value bunting, productive outs, speedy guys at the top of the order, etc. etc. Having someone come in that will likely be making “crazy” decisions because “a computer told him to” is probably going to be looked on with derision. We saw how hard it was to win over front offices that were part of the good old boy network and they had the power to fire scouts way easier than it is to turn over a roster of players with actual playing talent because they don’t get the methodology and openly revolt.
Aisle424Quote Reply
Sam Fuld?
Suburban kidQuote Reply
This post made it over to the BTF Newsblog, FYI.
http://www.baseballthinkfactory.org/newsstand/discussion/obstructed_view_no_geeks_allowed_sabermetrics_on_the_field#When:10:22:33Z
MishQuote Reply
I don’t think Maddon is an analytical manager in the way being described above; he’s prone to giving up outs and bunts and whatnot. While he does follow the closer rule, he’s pretty good at managing his bullpen, and maybe more importantly, getting the most possible innings out of his starters. His defensive alignments are astute and probably uses the platoon advantage as well as possible (it helps having players like Ben Zobrist who can play 6 positions cromulently).
MishQuote Reply
Prince Fielder —> big lovable teddy bear
http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/01/25/phil-coke-prince-fielder-talk-to-kids-about-bullying/
Very nice work by the two gentlemen there.
Rice CubeQuote Reply
Great read, GW.
MylesQuote Reply
@ Aisle424:
I was just thinking that the number crunching and advanced stats didn’t really catch on until a former baseball player and all-around cool guy like Billy Beane used it with the A’s. Might take a manager with some flair (like a super-Maddon) to get this analyst-in-the-dugout idea going. Having managers that are at least receptive to front office input re: stats and optimization is a good start though.
Rice CubeQuote Reply
Aisle424 wrote:
I think this is a good point. While baseball seems to move faster than other sports in many ways, I still think it moves slowly. There are a lot of players in baseball right now who have a decent understanding of sabermetrics and there will only be more and more of them. The question is how do you push the players to accept this kind of change when they’re making far more than the manager does? Playing the game is still an important part of earning a player’s respect. It’s probably less so than it once was and my guess it will be less and less important.
dmick89Quote Reply
@ Mish:
Mike Emeigh makes a good point too:
I have no doubt that an analyst will find his way into the dugout at some point. It probably isn’t too far off, but I don’t think we’ll see him running the on-field team for awhile. Baseball players are going to have to warm to the idea of this.
One other thing that could be a much bigger issue is when teams go bad. If we look at how the Red Sox players kept throwing Bobby V under the bus last year (not that he didn’t do the same), I think there would be a lot more of that. The attacks against the analytical manager would probably be even worse and more common. It will take a strong GM and owner willing to stand ground and continue to back the decision they made.
Right now though, why not bench coach? Does he really provide anything that another veteran back-up couldn’t be responsible for?
dmick89Quote Reply
BerseliusQuote Reply
new shit
dmick89Quote Reply
Maybe this will actually happen now that Tom Tango has been hired.
BudManQuote Reply
Yes Budman this will change in the future for the team to follow…
Jessica hongrieQuote Reply