For those who didn't see it last year.The Must Trade suggestion post.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.ph…Perfect for those who don't want to be QO'd.

— David Cameron (@DCameronFG) January 3, 2013

Recall that a pitcher who is traded in his final year does not have compensation attached. A must-trade clause would make for some interesting market dynamics, to say the least.

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Sanchez is a better pitcher to be certain, but a cursory glance at the two pitchers does Jackson a real disservice. Sanchez has pitched 195.2 innings on average the past 3 years, and at a FIP of 3.40. That's studly, but also misleading. Sanchez missed time due to injury as recently as spring training this year, and has had more than his share of injuries throughout his career. 

On the other hand, Edwin Jackson has been nothing short of a workhorse. He's averaged 32 starts a season ever since he's had a full season in the big leagues, 6 years ago. While he was no good at all his first couple seasons, you can attribute some of that to his being new. In the past 3 years, Jackson has had a marked improvement in first pitch strikes (from an average of 54% to 59%), and that's allowed him to work out of the zone deeper into the count. Working ahead of the count is a primary driver of getting strikeouts and ground balls (people just want to put it in play at that point), and those are sustainable recipes of success. Over the last 3 seasons, Jackson has thrown an average of 199.2 innings of 3.75 FIP ball. That's demonstrably worse than Sanchez but still very valuable.

A 5-year contract would bring Jackson into his age-33 season, which is not very far from a peak year. As an injury concern, Jackson has to be pretty low on your list of concerns. He's proven (repeatedly) that he has the stuff to consistenly work in the middle of a rotation. I don't set a TON of value by pitching WAR, but it seems to me that Jackson is a very good bet to give you 3 WAR a year on average over the next 5 years. If a win this year is worth 4.5 million (and I'd like to think it's around there), you'd expect a contract of 5/60 to provide you with 14.6 million in surplus value (5% inflation) over the next 5 years. That sounds right around what I'd expect, considering the non-neglible risk of injury and/or regression.

One last point to remember: free agency is only going to get more competitive (as the new CBA closes down avenues to outspend in other ways). We might not get another chance to add a mid-rotation piece this cheaply again. Next year's FA pitching class looks like David Weathers when we consider that most of those big names will get re-signed or extended. The Cubs have money, and their time for contention is sooner than you might think (we might put together a non-embarrassment in 2014, here's to hoping). We should get good players while they are available.

Last note: obviously I'd much rather have Jackson for 4 years/48 million. I don't think that will happen now, though if the rumors are true about where Sanchez might have signed had the Cubs not stepped in, that would have been an easy sign.

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It’s not like Campana just attempts a bunch of stolen bases and gets caught a bunch, either. He only got caught 3 times last year. He’s 54/5 in his MLB career, a skill he’s refined since the minors (where he was a pedestrian 162/49). His stolen bases are a real asset (anything over 73% is a positive, as a general rule), and  add a perverse type of slugging to his skill set.

Unfortunately killer speed (I’d say Billy Hamilton, Jarrod Dyson, and Rajai Davis are faster – Trout is a push) is Campana’s only real asset. He’s got no arm in center, and no feel for the outfield anyway. For someone as fast as Tony is, he sure doesn’t have the greatest range in center. He has poor instincts masked by his incredible foot speed, making him a below-average fielder (albeit one with a huge capability to grow). He’s also the weakest player in recent memory: the only way he’ll ever hit a home run is if it’s inside-the-park. I’m not sure he’ll ever hit a ball to the warning track, to be honest.

He also doesn’t really get on base. Since Campana is never going to hit more than singles and the occasional double/triple down the line, batting average is especially useless in his case. Campana isn’t driving in anyone, and he’s ending up at 2nd no matter how he gets on base. Thus, OBP is literally the only slash I care about in Campana’s case (and I truly couldn’t tell you what his BA or SLG are, even in the ballpark). His minor league OBP is .356 and his major league OBP is .306. That’s not going to cut it, even for him.

Offense

Campana has to maximize his one strength, his other-worldly speed. As such, I’m only going to focus on ways he could improve in this area.

For one, Campana doesn’t see nearly enough pitches. That’s hard to change, however; since he has no power, pitchers are going to work him in the zone all day. Campana sees 53.6% of his pitches in the zone (league average last year was 49.3%), and that’s a trend that will continue. The absolutely crazy part about that, though, is that Campana swings at bad pitches anyway (36.3% of pitches outside of zone, way higher than the 29.0% average). He is so toothless at the plate that pitchers know he’ll swing at anything and throw him strikes anyway. He’ll have to maintain pretty high contact rates to grind out ABs, and just look for mistakes he can do something with (which will come few and far between considering no pitcher fears Tony Campana)

Campana’s utter lack of power means he can only bat #1, #2, #7, or #8. His speed is wasted on the #8 hole; you usually want a fast guy, but that’s because you want him to get bunted over to second by the pitcher and knocked in by #1 or #2 and Campana will be standing on 2nd when the pitcher squares up to bunt anyways. It’s not a waste, of course (Campana will be on 3rd more often, scoring on sac flies basically anywhere), but not completely optimal. Campana strikes out too much and doesn’t put the ball in the outfield enough to bat #2, so he’s relegated to a leadoff position of a bottom of the order type. He doesn’t see enough pitches or get on base enough to bat leadoff, so I’d imagine that Campana will only ever see time at the very bottom of an order.

Defense

Campana does not have great instincts for centerfield, often taking terrible lines to the ball and just plain misjudging distances. He also has no cannon to speak of, so the corners are generally out. Campana does, however, have incredible speed, so with some coaching I see no reason why he couldn’t be a very good defensive fielder in a few years (for a few years).

Summary

When you only have one tool, you’ve got to make sure it’s a good one. Campana does. If he never figures it out as a hitter, Tony still has a place on a major league team as a 5th OF/pinch runner. That doesn’t provide a lot of value to the Cubs, but it also doesn’t come at any real cost. If you could get anything in value for Campana, you’d be a fool not to trade him, but at the modest price he commands, I wouldn’t hate keeping him for a while.

Now, if he could just perfect the art of beating a ball into the ground so it pops up really high…

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Alberto Cabrera was the Rob Deer of pitching in 2012. He faced 99 batters in the MLB in 2012. He let one take him deep, walked 18, and struck out 27 others. That’s 46 of 99 batters, good for 46.5% of all plate appearances (In this analogy, Carlos Marmol is Adam Dunn – both similarly effective in 2011).

Cabrera sported an ERA of 5.40 in the majors last year, but in a small sample size (21.2 innings) and in spite of a 3.83 FIP (Cabrera did, however, carry a 4.59 xFIP, indicating he wasn’t entirely unlucky).

The Cubs have decided to make Cabrera the 8th or 9th starter in 2013. How will that work out?

Pitch Selection

It’s a fool’s errand to put any stock in 390 major league pitches, but I am a fool. PITCHf/x has Cabrera utilizing 3 pitches: a 4 and 2 seam fastball, thrown 35% and 25% and 94 and 93 mph, respectively. His other offering is an 83 mph slider. There’s no real way to glean any constructive data from PITCHf/x here, so I’ll resort to the scouting reports, which say that he can dial it up to 97 on the fastball but maybe doesn’t have the best control of his slidepiece at the moment.

Stuff

Cabrera never had eye-popping peripherals until 2012; SO/BBs of 1.23/1.35/2.50/1.36 isn’t exactly the stuff of the legends. He was also eminently hittable in those years; his WHIP in the minors is a worse-than-pedestrian 1.540, even including his breakout 2012. However, in 2012, he also struck out 12.1 per 9, paired against 2.3 walks per 9. That IS the Pedro Martinez blueprint of the minors (albeit in 55 innings). I don’t have much to go by here, but my best guess is that his stuff just played out a LOT better as a reliever. Having no offspeed pitch but the ability to throw 97 tends to do that to a guy.

Summary

Cabrera could possibly carve out a career as a good middle reliver/setup man in the bigs as soon 2013. I don’t foresee a ton of success as a starter. He couldn’t do it his first 6 years in the bigs, and without a secondary pitch you can throw for strikes, the odds are good he won’t do it now. In the best case, the Cubs find some more depth at Iowa to start and Cabrera takes on his true role as a 2013 pen arm. In the worst case, we see just how many walks a guy with no secondary offering can issue in his 10 spot starts in Chicago.
 

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Drafted with the 47th overall pick in 2005, Bowden hung around the Boston organization for 7 years, never really showing a whole lot in the majors but nearly always dominating the minor leagues. Michael would hang around the bottom of the BA Top 100 prospect lists from 2007 to 2009, but he would never really put it together at the Major League level. After a “failed” conversion to the bullpen, the Red Sox traded Bowden (along with Hunter Cervenka, a non-prospect) for Marlon Byrd, who promptly got busted for PED and was dead on arrival anyways.

Bowden put up a nice 2.95 ERA for the Cubs in 2012, but it was ephemeral; his FIP was 4.32 and his BABIP was only .250. Combined with the nebulous nature of reliever ERA, it doesn’t take a huge leap of the imagination to assume that Bowden was just lucky last year. His peripheral stats were in line with his career numbers, and it doesn’t seem like there’s a whole lot of excess value here.

The Cubs decided after the 2012 season to stretch Bowden back into a starter. I understand the move from a depth standpoint, as a replacement-level starter is worth slightly more than a replacement-level reliever. Still just 25, Bowden has a chance to take step forward with his new organization, but I wouldn’t bet on it.

Pitch Selection

Bowden has 3 primary offerings. His primary pitch is a fastball (55%) of the time, which he throws 91 mph on average. It has a below-average PITCHf/x grade, but I don’t read into primary pitch grades all that often, as a pitch like this is thrown generally for strikes (and is eminently more hittable). I’d say the offering is probably only slightly below average. Next up is an 83 mph slider (25%) that is his best pitch. It’s an above-average pitch, and hitters last year had a wOBA of .264 against the offering last year (.244 career). Rounding out his arsenal is a changeup (20%) that is thrown at 84 mph and is routinely rocked. Bowden will need to really refine an off-speed pitch if he wants to stick as a starter.

Stuff

Bowden’s pitches don’t really fool anyone. Batters swing on pitches in the zone much more often than normal against Michael, and pitches out of the zone much less often. In both cases, batters make less contact than normal, though not by much. This is an interesting trend that isn’t very common; usually if batters consistently diagnose balls and strikes, they are going to make solid contact when they do choose to swing. For one reason or another, they just aren’t making the contact they should. This gives me hope that Bowden can develop into a higher-strikeout pitcher by inducing more swings out of the zone/less swings in the zone and maintaining his average contact numbers.

Summary

I don’t expect a lot out of Bowden in 2013 (or honestly, in the future). There’s probably some upside to be unlocked, and don’t forget that Theo knows the Boston system better than probably anyone on Earth. Bowden probably won’t be more than the 7th or 8th starter on the club in 2013, and he’s at medium risk of being waived if an intriguing option becomes available. If Bowden can work a little more out of the zone, he could be become an effective middle reliever or swingman. My guess is we might not see that in 2013.

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He signed Scott Feldman to a one-year, $6 million pact, but the true bargain of the 2 Scotts he signed this year is Scott Baker. Baker signed a $5.5 million deal + incentives, on a one-year “prove it” deal. He signed up knowing that he was going to be traded at midseason if he recovered to his post-TJS abilities. He had TJS in April of 2011, and his return should coincide with the beginning of the 2013 season (though he could miss some initial time).

When Baker has been healthy, he’s been effective. He sports an ERA identical to his FIP (3.86), and has been worth a minimum of 2.6 wins in the past 5 years. He works around a .300 BABIP as well, so you don’t have to worry about being hit lucky or unlucky. Probably my favorite stat of Baker’s is his absurd 3.34 K/BB rate. That’s an elite level talent, even if he’s not heralded as an elite pitcher.

Pitch Selection

Baker’s primary offering is by far his sinker, though it’s a really a sinker/fastball mix. He throws the pitch 65% of the time, and it hits 91 mph on the gun. In 2011, it was a legitimate plus pitch, teetering on plus-plus. His only other real pitch is a forgettable 82 mph slider, which he throws 30% of the time. In 2011 it was bad, but in every other year it was an average to good pitch. I attribute that to small sample size, it’s likely just an average pitch. His other offering is a changeup he mixes in 5% of the time; it’s hard to tell how good the pitch is because it’s so rarely thrown. Overall, it grades out to well below average on PITCHf/x.

SI/C: 1.34
FB/C: 0.97
SL/C -1.13
CH/C: -1.11

Stuff

Baker works in the zone much more often than your average starter, at it helps to keep walks down. However, it doesn’t lead to more contact; he induces 10.4% of swinging strikes (the average is 8.6%). That’s very encouraging. The combination of working in the zone and not inducing great contact is a recipe for success.

Summary

Scott Baker needs a successful recovery from TJS to be worth anything in 2013. If he does, the change alone to the NL Central will be all that’s needed to take his already considerable skillset and turn it into a long-term asset for the Cubs. TJS is no sure thing, but the recovery rates are getting better and better. If Baker’s rehab goes swimmingly, the Cubs stand to reap a pretty huge reward for just $5.5 million.

To put it into perspective, the Cubs received a fringe-top 100 prospect (Christian Villanueva) for half of a season of Ryan Dempster last year, who had provided 2.1 WAR for the Cubs at that point. He had also been a routinely 2-3 WAR pitcher for the past 4 years. Scott Baker more or less fits that role to a tee. He’ll also be considerably cheaper for that same rental, so teams that don’t have budget can enter the bidding. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a Top 75-100 type come back for Baker next July.
  

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I don’t really get it. 

Scott Feldman is a fair injury risk, missing a good chunk of time essentially every year of the past 6 (the only time he’s had over 165 organizational innings was 2009). Even when he’s healthy, he’s not that great. He sports a career 4.81 ERA gleaned from a 4.56 FIP, and the xFIP shows 4.52 as well. He was worth 2.3 fWAR (0.0 bWAR) last year, but still gave up over 5 runs per 9. In 2012, he was eminently replacement-level.

The Cubs are gambling on Feldman’s health and the changeover from AL West to NL Central. They are also looking for the upside in 32 innings of 2011 ball and 189.2 innings in 2009, which was 3 injuries away. This is a gamble they will likely lose.

Pitch Selection

Feldman is interesting in the sense that he abandoned his fastball in 2010. He doesn’t really throw one anymore, it’s more of a slider. He throws his slider around 35% of the time now, and it sits at 91 mph and frankly isn’t that good. It’s never rated as more than average according to PITCHf/x. Feldman also throws a 90 mph cutter (25%) and a 77 mph curve (25%), and both are average to middling offerings. Feldman will throw the occasional 86 mph change (10%) and 90 mph fastball (5%), but neither are effective or notable.

Stuff

Feldman has very average stuff. He works in the zone a little more than the average pitcher, and as a result batters tend to make a little more contact off of him. He doesn’t induce a lot of swinging strikes, but Feldman takes the tradeoff in the form of a very acceptable walk rate (2.33 per 9 last year). The increased contact also makes the typical Feldman plate appearance take more pitches than average; Feldman isn’t going to get very deep into starts.

Summary

The Feldman signing makes sense with respect to the need to have competent pitching at the back end of a roster. I‘m not sure it makes sense from the standpoint of creating a flippable asset, as I don’t think the market for #4 or #5 starters is going to be positively bare at the trade deadline. In any case, it’s only $6 million, and the Cubs can certainly afford it. I don’t think it’s a low-risk, high-reward situation; it’s more like low-risk, low-reward. Time will tell if Scott #2 proves me wrong.

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DeJesus signed a 2 year, 8.5 million contract with a 2014 team option at 6.5 (1.5 buyout). The reason DeJesus was to be had so cheaply was the appearance of a dwindling skillset: his OBP crashed from .384 to .323 in just one season. That doesn’t tell the whole story, though; the primary driver of that descent was an abnormally high and then low BABIP (.355 in 2010, .274 in 2011). The Cubs were willing to take a gamble on the aberrant nature of DeJesus’ BABIP, and it paid off…kinda.

DeJesus got on base 35% of the time last year, which is a pretty good number and in line with the rest of his career numbers. Unfortunately, the power from 2010 has more or less eroded. A .403 SLG from RF is untenable unless you are a defensive mastermind, which DeJesus is not. For David to have more than just average value, he’ll have to recoup some power or get on base with a greater frequency; home runs might not happen but DeJesus has some gap power.

Offense

DeJesus’ primary value comes from his ability to extend plate appearances and get on base. He sports a career .355 OBP and 8.6% walk rate. That means that while he walks the same as a normal player, he consistently has a BABIP in the .315 range, making his batting average 15 points higher than the league average. If his BABIP were to fall to .300, he’d be essentially league average in every way (save lower power), but after 3305 AB we can be confident that .315 hovers around his true value.

DeJesus doesn’t strike out all that often; his career rate is 13.6%, 4% less than the league average. The fact that he maintains a low strikeout rate while going deep into at-bats is a huge, hidden bonus on offense and makes him the ideal #2 hitter in a line-up. He swings at less pitches than the average, and makes contact with pitches at a much, much higher rate than normal. That’s the trademark of a hitter that is not only intelligent, but consistent as well. DeJesus will likely be good for longer than is normal.

Defense 

DeJesus plays best, by far, in left field. He doesn’t have a great arm in right, but for some reason he’s always had a good noodle in left, and is range is much improved there is well. He plays a passable centerfield as well, and in another era that’d be where is most useful; right now, there is a glut of talent at CF in the big leagues, so his positional flexibility isn’t as useful per se. He won’t kill you at any spot in the outfield, but as you go from left to right, as a rule he’s less and less useful to a club.

Summary

David DeJesus is a smart, consistent player. I’m a big fan of the guy, and could see him being a hitting coach in the future. His best days are probably behind him, though. His age-33 season is coming up, and he does have value to a team that needs a cheap outfielder with an extra year of team control. The contract is worth 10 million over 2 years, and he should give you 2 WAR each year for the next 2. That’s a similar value to Alfonso Soriano; a back-end of a team’s top 10 prospects or a few live arms. I’d probably hold off on trading DeJesus if you trade Soriano and slot him at left (someone has to play there, right?). He’d make a mighty fine, affordable, midseason trade chip, and I believe that’s what the Cubs will do.

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Originally from the Mariners organization, Luis saw a cup of coffee with Seattle in 2008, until December 11, when he was part of a 3-team trade that involved an astonishing 13 players. Valbuena would spend a good amount of time in 2009 and 2010 with Cleveland, though he could never hit above .250/.298/.416 in either year. The Indians tired of his offensive deficiencies, and kept him in Columbus for the bulk of 2011. The Blue Jays purchased his contract in November of 2011, but they waived him and the Cubs picked him up.

In 2012, Luis spent the first third of the season in AAA, and he hit pretty well there. He earned an injury call-up after Stewart went down for the season, and stayed up the rest of the year, hitting .219/.310/.340, “good” for a .290 wOBA. He played above-average defense at the hot corner en route to contributing 0.9 WAR last year.

The Cubs did not upgrade at 3B this off-season, and Theo & Co. have decided to start Vitters in AAA next season. Valbuena and Stewart will be clashing for the starting spot; the loser will be the backup/utility infielder (if Stewart can handle 2B).

Offense

Valbuena is offensively-challenged in much the same way Darwin Barney is. Luis sports a career .283 wOBA and a .269 BABIP. These numbers suggest a lot of room for improvement, and luckily for Luis, there is some. A .269 BABIP is pretty low, and could easily climb to .290 or .300. Bill James projects a .295 BABIP for Valbuena next year, the primary driver for a wOBA of .320, which I think anyone would take from Valbuena (or 3B in general) at this point.

Valbuena doesn’t have much power, especially from 3B, but he has slightly above-average plate discipline and he doesn’t strike out more than average. He’s not fast an a poor baserunner, but the Cubs’ FO minimizes those parts of the game anyway, so it’s not a complete worry.

Defense

Valbuena played pretty good defense at third last year, but before 2012 he had been known basically as defensively inept. He can play 2B/SS/3B/LF, all fairly badly, but passably enough. If the gains from 2012 are real (and defensive metrics take YEARS to have enough data to show trends), he could carve out a little career as a backup infielder that can draw a walk. If he can’t, he’s a AAAA guy.

Summary

Valbuena has three paths to sticking on a major league roster. Either he can realize his 2012 gains with the glove and stick around as a utility infielder, or he can bring up his offensive numbers to where you can live with his poor defense (still as a backup). Lastly, he can be on the Cubs, where we have no other real options. If Stewart never recovers from his wrist, the job is Valbuenas regardless of talent level. I’m not holding my breath that Valbuena will ever have a wOBA above .300, and I’m not holding my breath that he’s suddenly become a defensive stalwart. Luis is organization filler; unfortunately for us, the hole he’s filling in our organization right now might be “starting 3B.”

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Wood made his debut in the majors in 2010, throwing 102.2 innings of 3.51 ERA ball. He wasn’t lucky, either: his FIP was 3.42. As an age-23 season, it was quite impressive: he even threw a 3.31 K/BB ratio in there for good measure.

He hasn’t repeated his good fortune since. In 2011, his ERA ballooned to 4.84, and his FIP rose to 4.06 as well. His BABIP went a lot higher (.324 from .259), and he lost a K per 9 while gaining a BB per 9. Things were not going in the right direction, and the Reds jettisoned him in the 2011 offseason for premier set-up man Sean Marshall.

As a Cub, his season was arguably worse in 2012. Travis got his ERA down to 4.27, but his FIP climbed all the way to 4.84. His BABIP was crazily, crazily low (.244), so he was generally hit-lucky, but HR-unlucky (his rate essentially doubled to 12.7% HR/FB and 1.44 HR/9).

What Travis Wood will we see in 2013? Will it be the very good 2010 model, or the much worse 2012 version?

Pitch Selection

Wood throws 3 pitches with any regularity, though he’s been mixing in an 80mph slider more this year.

His first offering is an 89 mph fastball. It’s not a very good pitch (below average, by linear weights), but it’s not an absolute killer. He throws it around 50% of the time. His cutter is around 87 mph and he threw it 30% of the time in 2012. PITCHf/x rates it as above average. His changeup makes up another 10% of his pitches, and it’s 80 mph. His changeup was rocked last year, probably because it ended up being a home run nearly every time he threw it. Lastly, Wood mixed in an 80 mph slider 10% of the time last year, and it was surprisingly effective. It was far and away his best pitch according to PITCHf/x last year.

This jives somewhat with the early scouting reports I’ve seen on Wood. Many of them praise his great changeup, but it doesn’t get hitters out at the major league level (and it hasn’t all 3 years). He started developing his cutter around 2009, which has turned into his best pitch, and a weapon he’ll have to use effectively if he wants to stick in the bigs.

Stuff

Travis is never going to overpower major league hitters. He’s essentially average in inducing swings, with the minor exception of not fooling people outside. The problem, though, is that hitters make contact with Wood at an alarming rate outside of the zone. That’s the primary driver for his decreased strikeout rate and very indicate of a lack of dominance. Players that swing at Travis Wood’s pitches make contact at the 12th highest rate in baseball, among contemporaries like Kevin Millwood, Lucas Harrell, and Bronson Arroyo. He’s 6th in the league in O-contact% (the percentage of times a ball is out of the zone, the batter swings, and makes contact anyway). This is the surest recipe for not striking guys out (in fact, Wood’s 6.87 is the highest of the top 10 in this category).

Summary

Travis Wood is never going to strikeout a batter per 9 innings. He’ll likely struggle to strikeout 8 per 9 innings. For this reason, he’ll never amount to more than a #4 or #5 starter (unless he has a preternatural ability to locate his pitches that we haven’t seen yet). I think the ceiling for Wood is very low, but the floor is pretty high. He’s consistenly shown the ability to get some outs in the major league level, and there is value for an innings-eater at the back of less-than-impressive rotations (not a lot of value, but some).

Wood also has shown the ability to retire lefties at a pretty healthy rate (.215/.287/.342), so on a good team, he might be a swingman/LOOGY. As it happens right now, he’s our #5 starter. Time will tell if he can stay that way.

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